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THE ISSUANCE OF SECURITIES IN
REORGANIZATIONS AND ARRANGEMENTS
UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY ACT AND THE
PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT
Beginning with the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933,' it
has been the policy of the federal government to supervise closely the
issuance and sale of securities by requiring their prior registration
with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The disclosure of
important facts concerning the securities is required before securities
can be legally issued. The general purpose of the disclosure require-
ments is to enable investors to make a realistic appraisal of the merits
of the security and thus make an informed investment decision. How-
ever, as a result of certain exemptions from the registration require-
ment, securities issued in corporate reorganizations under Chapter X
of the Bankruptcy Act, and securities issued in arrangements under
Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act are rarely registered. The purpose
of this comment is to examine critically the principal exemptions
applicable in the corporate reorganization context, § 3(a)(10) of the
Securities Act of 1933,2 § 264(a)(2) of Chapter X,3 and § 393(a)(2)
of Chapter X14 in order to determine their purposes, their present
uses and abuses, and their suggested continuance under the proposed
Bankruptcy Act and the proposed American Law Institute Securities
Code.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE BASIC STATUTES
A. The Securities Act of 1933
The Securities Act of 1933 was the congressional response to
numerous abusive practices prevailing in the 1920's. The basic thrust
of the Act is to require the disclosure in a registration statement of
material financial and other information concerning the security and
prohibit misrepresentation and fraudulent practices in connection
with the sale of securities. Stated differently, it was not the intention
of Congress to regulate the quality or fairness of the securities. Sec-
tion 5 of the Act requires that all securities be registered before they
may be sold in interstate commerce. The lack of any actual need for
' 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970).
2 15 U.S:C. § 77c(a)(10) (1970).
3 11 U.S.C. § 664(a)(2) (1970).
4 11 U.S.C. § 793(a)(2) (1970).
COMMENTS
investor protection via registration provides no independent grounds
for exemption in any case which is not otherwise exempt. The require-
ments of registration are rigorous and often involve substantial
amounts of money and time-resources not usually present in reorg-
anizations. While registration of all reorganization securities would
impose a substantial hardship on the debtor and his creditors, this
hardship is no grounds for exemption. The United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit has stated:
We do not agree with any language. . . which might be construed
as indicating that an issue of stock-otherwise subject to registra-
tion-could be excused therefrom on the basis that the time require-
ments of the registration procedure would be inimical to a proposed
plan of reorganization.'
There are, however, certain exemptions from the broad reach of
§ 5.6 Of primary concern in the bankruptcy context is the exemption
presently found in § 3(a)(10). As originally enacted, the exemption
was part of a broader exemption found in § 4(3). Section 4(3) stated
in part:
The provisions of § 5 shall not apply to any of the following transac-
tions: ....
[T]he issuance of securities to the existing security holders or other
existing creditors of a corporation in the process of a bona fide
reorganization of such corporation under the supervision of any
SEC v. Bloomberg, 299 F.2d 315, 318 (Ist Cir. 1962).
£ See, e.g., the exempt transactions of §§ 4 and 3(a)(9)-(I 1) and the exempt securities of §
3(a)(l)-(8). In addition, certain exemptions are inherent in the definitions of § 2. A peculiar
application of this latter approach of exemption by definition must be noted. Very early in the
SEC's history the terms "sale" and "value" were interpreted in such a manner that no sale
was held to take place for the purposes of the registration requirement in the exchange of stock
in certain mergers, consolidations, reclassifications, and transfers of assets. The position was
eventually formalized in rule 133. The "no sale" theory and rule 133 became "instrument[s] of
evasion of the law and a means by which illegal distributions of securities [were] achieved in
secrecy and in violation . . . of the registration and disclosure provisions of the Securities
Act. . . ." SEC Securities Act Release No. 3728 (Dec. 17, 1956). Huge numbers of securities
were offered without registration. Eventually a number of limitations and qualifications were
developed and rule 133 was amended several times. Finally in 1972, after much study, rule 133
and the "no sale" theory were specifically rejected by the adoption of rule 145. See generally I
L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 518-541 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss]; 4 Loss
2559-2573 (Supp. 1969). For a consideration of the impact of rule 145 on blue sky laws see
Note, State Regulation of Securities Issued in Corporate Reorganizations: A Cloud in the Blue
Sky, 25 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 149 (1974). The note contains a collection of citations to the
articles on rule 133 and the "no sale" theory at 150 n. 6.
The theory had little impact on reorganizations carried out under the Bankruptcy Act. But
it is primarily of historical interest today both for its own story and as one example of an
analogous situation showing the growth of the SEC's concern for extensive disclosure.
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court, either in exchange for the securities of such security holders
or claims of such creditors or partly for cash and partly in exchange
for the securities or claims of such security holders or creditors. 7
The purpose of the section was to
exempt the distribution of securities during a bona fide reorganiza-
tion of a corporation when such a reorganization is carried on under
the supervision of a court.
Reorganizations carried out without such judicial supervision
possess all the dangers implicit in the issuance of new securities and
are, therefore not exempt from the act. For the same reasons the
provision is not broad enough to include mergers or consolidations
of corporations entered into without judicial supervision.8
Section 4(3) was split into several separate sections and moved from
§ 4 to § 3 as a part of amendments to the Securities Act of 1933
contained in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1 As a part of these
amendments, § 3(a)(10) was enacted. It exempts
[a]ny security which is issued in exchange for one or more bona fide
outstanding securities, claims or property interests, or partly in such
exchange and partly for cash, where the terms and conditions of
such issuance and exchange are approved, after a hearing upon the
fairness of such terms and conditions at which all persons to whom
it is proposed to issue securities in such exchange shall have the right
to appear, by any court, or by any official or agency of the United
States, or by any State or Territorial banking or insurance
commission or other governmental authority expressly authorized
by law to grant such approval. °
The House Report states that § 3(a)(10) was intended to extend
the provisions of § 4(3).
to cover readjustments of rights of holders of securities, claims, and
property interests under court or similar supervision, even though
the original issuer of the securities, debtor on the claims, or owner
Act of May 27, 1933, ch. 38, § 4(3), 48 Stat. 75-77.
H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1933).
Act of June 6,1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 88 1. It has been the consistent position of the SEC
that this amendment did not alter the essential nature of these exemptions as transaction
exemptions. Thus although listed as an exempt security, any security issued pursuant to the §
3(a)(10) exemption is exempt only for its initial issuance. Another exemption must be found
for any subsequent resale without registration. See I Loss at 709-10; SEC Securities Act
Release No. 646 (Feb. 3, 1936). But see Shaw v. United States, 131 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1942).
For current applications of this concept see SEC No Action Letter, Seaferro, Inc., (March 23,
1971) and SEC No Action Letter, Decicom Systems, Inc., (March 2, 1973).
10 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1970).
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of the property in which intersts are held, is not itself in the process
or reorganization."1
The Report also added that
[a] limitation on the exemption has been added by the conferees in
the requirement that the approval of the court or official, in order
to be effective, must follow a hearing on the fairness of the terms
and conditions of the issuance and exchange of the securities at
which persons who are to receive such securities shall have a right
to appear. Security holders' committees are to be denied the oppor-
tunity of obtaining exemptions under this section if they secure and
exercise an exclusive right to appear for their depositors at hearings
on plans of reorganization."
An examination of §§ 3(a)(10) and 4(3) and their legislative histo-
ries reveals the point at which the § 3(a)(10) exemption fits into the
overall federal scheme of investor protection. The implication of the
statement that reorganizations carried out without judicial supervi-
sions are fraught with the same potential dangers as new issues of
securities shows that there is nothing inherent in securities issued in
reorganizations that obviates the need for investor protection through
disclosure. However, unlike other issues of securities, the need for
investor protection in reorganization issues is satisfied not by disclo-
sure of information through registration, but by judicial supervision.
Thus, shortly after § 3(a)(10) was added to the Securities Act of 1933,
the SEC stated that
the whole justification for the exemption afforded by section
3(a)(10) is that the examination and approval by the body in ques-
tion of the fairness of the issue in question in a substitute for the
protection afforded to the investor by the information which would
otherwise be made available to him through registration. 3
It must be noted that the § 3(a)(10) exemption is unique among the
provisions of the federal securities statutes in that it seeks to provide
investor protection in the same manner as state blue sky laws, i.e.,
through a requirement of substantive fairness. Under the other sec-
tions of the federal securities acts it is possible to issue worthless or
nearly worthless securities as long as there is adequate disclosure of
value and no violation of anti-fraud provisions found in the acts.
Under § 3(a)(10), it would seem possible to issue securities without
1t H. R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1934).
12 Id.
13 SEC Securities Act Release No. 312 (March 15, 1935).
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any, or at least minimal, disclosures of information14 to the offerees
as long as the court approves the terms and conditions of the issu-
ance. The general securities provisions rely on the premise that an
investor is qualified to make an investment decision when provided
with all the material facts. Section 3(a)(10) relies on the premise that
a judge or administrator is qualified to evaluate the substantive fair-
ness of the terms of a security without the assistance of a formal
registration statement or a formal requirement for similar informa-
tion. In the reorganization context the soundness of the latter premise
ultimately depends on the thoroughness and expertise of the judge in
supervising the transaction.
B. The Bankruptcy Act, Chapters X and XI
1. Historical Antecedents
Prior to 1934, the dominant mode of corporate reorganization
was the equity receivership. This method of reorganization was se-
verely criticized and in 1934 a formal statutory reorganization proce-
dure, § 77B,15 was added to the bankruptcy laws."6 The section was
comprehensive and represented a major advance over the equity re-
ceivership. It is sufficient to note that this statutory procedure con-
tained an exemption from the securities statutes. Section 77B(h)
stated in part that
[a]ll securities issued pursuant to any plan of reorganization ap-
proved by the court in accordance with the provisions of this section
• . . shall be exempt from all the provisions of the [Securities Act
of 1933 except the antifraud provisions]. 7
Neither the House"8 nor the Senate Reports 9 discuss the rationale for
the exemption, and exactly how Congress intended the exemption to
'1 It may be possible that rule lOb-5 and other anti-fraud provisions require the disclosure
of a minimum amount of information and, of course, once any information is disclosed the
seller may not omit any information necessary to make the statements made not misleading.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (1970); rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974).
' Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 204, 48 Stat. I11.
, The equity receivership remained an alternative form of reorganization until 1944 when
the Second Circuit held that a receiver was irregularly appointed anytime there was a statutory
alternative to the equity receivership. New England Coal & Coke Co. v. Rutland R.R., 143
F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1944). Since that time all federal reorganizations and arrangments have been
pursuant to the various provisions of Title 11.
' Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 204 § 77b(h), 48 Stat. 111.
'8 The House Report, H.R. REP. No. 194, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. (1933) discusses subsection
(h) at page 7 without reference to the securities exemption.
," The Senate Report, S. REP. No. 482, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) discusses subsection
(h) at page 9 without reference to the exemption.
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be reconciled with the exemptions in the Securities Act of 1933 is not
clear.20
2. Chapters X and XI
Extensive study by the SEC,21 various congressional committees,
and the National Bankruptcy Conference2 eventually prompted the
enactment of the Chandler Act in 1938.23 The act established a
reorganization procedure in Chapters X and XI which has continued
to this date with few major changes.2
Chapter X is designed for "reorganization in the grand man-
ner. ' 25 It contemplates a lengthy procedure in which creditors and
security holders are given maximum protection against unscrupulous
conduct by insiders. The entire proceeding is a matter of public con-
cern, with the SEC playing a major role. The court is charged with
extensive supervisory responsibilities. Among other things the court
" Probably the impact of the Securities Act was not fully considered because it had been
in effect only for a short time. The House Report on the bill which enacted § 77B is dated June
2, 1933 and the Securities Act was passed on May 2, 1933. The Senate report is dated March
15, 1934, andthe bill itself was passed on June 7, 1934 one day after the passage of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 which put § 3(a)(10) into its present form.
1 SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK ACTIVITIES, PERSON-
NEL, AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES, PARTS I-VII (1934-
1940).
n The National Bankruptcy Conference arose during this time as a group of persons
interested in revising the 1898 Act and unsatisfied with the proposals for reform which had been
put forth. After explaining the dissatisfaction of the various parties, James McLaughlin ex-
plained the group's origin in 1932:
The result was what later came to be styled the National Bankruptcy Confer-
ence. Two referees, four lawyers, and one full time law teacher met at a lawyer's
home in Wellesley, Mass., one week end in June, 1932, and, pursuant to a declared
intention to draft all necessary amendments to the Act by Monday next, spent three
days arguing about the definitions in section I. . . . Additional members were added
from time to time as particular interest or particular competence appeared or as
particular subject matter called for the introduction of specialized talent. . . . Mem-
bers ocassionally added for reasons of diplomacy or promotion did not seriously
impair the work. Aged conversatives impressed with the perfections of the Act of
1898 died, withdrew from active participation or gradually acquired an almost
human elasticity of mind.
McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, 4 U. CHI. L. REv.
369, 376 (1937) [hereinafter cited as McLaughlin].
2 11 U.S.C. § I et seq. (1970) (originally enacted as Act of June 28, 1938, ch. 575, 52
Stat. 840). See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES, H. R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., part I, 237-244 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as COMMISSION REPORT]; and McLaughlin at 374-378, for a short history of these various
studies.
" The major changes occurred in 1952. See Act of July 7, 1952, ch. 576, 66 Stat. 420.
2 Rostow and Cutler, Competing Systems of Corporate Reorganization: Chapters X and
XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 YALE L. J. 1334 (1939).
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must make an initial determination that the petition is filed in good
faith l and that it is reasonable to expect that a plan of reorganization
can be effected.27 Existing management is routinely displaced 8 and a
trustee is appointed to operate the business. The trustee prepares a
plan of reorganization which is usually submitted to the SEC for an
advisory report.29 The court then conducts a hearing on the plan to
which all interested parties receive notice and in which they have the
right to participate."0 The court must find that the plan is fair and
equitable and feasible. 3' After the court approves the plan it is
mailed along with any opinions of the court and the SEC report to
all creditors and stockholders affected by it.32 Only after this ap-
proval may acceptances be solicited.3 Subject to the "cram down"
rules,34 when the plan receives the requisite two-thirds approval it
may be confirmed by the court and consummated.
Chapter XI contemplates a much quicker, less extensive proce-
dure. Chapter XI substitutes the protections of Chapter X for a
faster, simpler, more economical substitute to liquidation. The debtor
usually remains in possession 5 and continues to operate the busi-
28 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 546 (1970). In the overall context of Chapter X the good faith
requirement has a somewhat broader meaning. Basically, it is "a criterion which enables the
judge to determine, on the particular facts presented whether the financial, economic and legal
situation of the debtor is one within the contemplation of Chapter X." 6 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
1019 (J. Moore ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER].
S11 U.S.C. § 546 (1970).
I' 11 U.S.C. §§ 556-559 (1970). In cases where the debtor has over $250,000 indebtedness
an independent trustee must be appointed. In all other cases the court may appoint a trustee
or trustees.
- II U.S.C. § 572 (1970). This is only mandatory in cases where the corporation's sched-
uled indebtedness exceeds $3,000,000.
30 11 U.S.C. § 571 (1970).
31 11 U.S.C. §§ 574, 616 (1970). "Fair and equitable" are words of art which were used
in § 77B and had acquired a fixed meaning through judicial interpretations prior to the enact-
ment of Chapter X. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115 (1939). The
fixed meaning of the words was the absolute priority rule. That is,
a plan is not "fair and equitable" unless it provides participation for claims and
interests in complete recognition of their strict priorities, and unless the value of the
debtor's assets supports the extent of participation afforded each class of claims or
interests included in the plan. Any arrangement by which a junior class receives
values allocable to a senior class [violates the rule].
6A COLLIER at 613.
The feasibility test in Chapter X tests the economic soundness and the practical viability
of the plan. It encompasses such things as whether all the stipulations of the plan can be carried
out, the adequacy of the capital structure, the ability of management to carry out the plan, the
sufficiency of the earning power of the entity to meet its obligations, etc. 6A COLLIER at 637-
644.
3 11 U.S.C. § 575 (1970).
- 1 U.S.C. § 576 (1970).
11 U.S.C. §§ 616(7)-(8) (1970).
- 11 U.S.C. § 732 (1970); FED. BANK. R. 11-18(b). Prior to the rules the referee had more
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ness.3 The debtor formulates a plan of arrangement which may
modify only the right of unsecured creditors .3  The debtor then so-
licts acceptances and after a majority of creditors in number and
dollar amount accept the plan the court holds a hearing on the plan.
The court then confirms the plan if it was proposed and accepted in
good faith, is in the best interest of creditors, and is feasible. 8 Upon
confirmation, the plan may be consummated. The entire proceeding
is viewed as largely a private affair between the debtor and its unse-
cured creditors with the SEC having little or no participation.
Despite the intent of Congress, today most corporate debtors
including large publicly held debtors ignore the costly, time consum-
ing process of Chapter X. Because of its speed and flexibility and
because specialists in the area have been able to overcome the two
chief limitations of Chapter XI-the inability to affect secured
creditors and equity security interests-Chapter XI has become "the
dominant reorganization vehicle."39
3. Sections 264 and 393
Both Chapter X and Chapter XI contain specific exemptions
from registration for securities issued in either a reorganization or an
arrangement. Section 264 of Chapter X states:
a. The provisions of section 77e of Title 15 [Section 5 of the
Securities Act of 19331 shall not apply to-
(2) Any transaction in any security issued pursuant to a plan
in exchange for securities of or claims against the debtor or
discretion to appoint a receiver. Whether the debtor was continued in possession or displaced
by a receiver depended largely on local practice. See Hertzberg, A Survey of Chapter Xl with
a Side Trip Through ChapterX, 77 CoM. L. J. 86 (1972).
3, 11 U.S.C. § 743 (1970); FED. BANK. R. 11-23, 11-30, 11-45.
- II U.$.C. § 756 (1970).
-I I U.S.C. § 766 (1970). Good faith in the Chapter XI context depends entirely on the
circumstances and cannot practically be comprehensively defined. "Broadly speaking, the basic
inquiry should be whether or not under the circumstances of the case there has been an abuse
of the provisions, purpose or spirit of Chapter XI in the proposal or acceptance of the arrange-
ment." 9 COLLIER at 318.
The feasibility requirement of Chapter XI tests "whether the things which are to be done
after confirmation can be done as a practical matter under the facts." 9 COLLIER at 287. It is
very close to the feasibility requirement of Chapter X (see note 31 supra), but is generally
understood to be less stringent because of the different purposes of Chapter XI.
The "best interests of creditors" test is limited almost entirely to an inquiry into whether
the creditors would receive more under the Chapter X arrangement than what they would
receive in a liquidation proceeding. If they would receive more under the arrangement the plan
meets the test. See generally 9 COLLIER at 380-85.
"' COMMISSION REPORT, Part I at 244.
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partly in such exchange and partly for cash and/or prop- 211
erty. 40
Section 393(a)(2) of Chapter XI, insofar as it is relevant here, reads
the same way but omits the words "securities of or"4 and substitutes
"6pursuant to an arrangement" for "pursuant to a plan".42 Thus al-
though the two chapters contain radically different methods for deal-
ing with financially distressed businesses and different degrees of
protection for creditors and equity holders, the exemptions from reg-
istration are identical. They are based on the same criteria and have
the same limitations.
Exactly why the two sections are identical and, more fundamen-
tally, why they were even included in the Bankruptcy Act in view of
the § 3(a)(10) exemption in the Securities Act is not at all clear. The
legislative analysis of the section states only that:
Section 264 is derived in part from section 77B(h). Under this provi-
sion no registration in compliance with the Securities Act of 1933
is required for the issuance of securities to the security holders or
creditors of the debtor in whole or part exchange for their old
securities or claims. However, new issues sold by the reorganized
company for cash are required to be registered under the Securities
Act just as any other new issues of securities, in order that prospec-
tive investors may have all material information before buying.
Furthermore, the exemption for the issuance of securities to security
holders and creditors under the plan does not extend to any subse-
quent redistribution of such securities by the issuer or an underwri-
ter; for any such redistribution is subject to the same need for public
disclosure of relevant data as in the case of a new issue.43
It seems odd that no reference was made to § 3(a)(10) or even
to the ultimate policy reasons for the two exemptions. It should be
noted, however, that Congress specifically did not base the exemption
on any intrinsic fairness of securities issued in judicially supervised
40 11 U.S.C. § 664 (1970).
11 As originally enacted § 393 did contain the words "securities of or." The words were
deleted by a 1962 amendment. Act of Sept. 25, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-681, § 16, 76 Stat. 570
(1962), amending 11" U.S.C. § 793(a)(2) (1970). The amendment was urged by the SEC. Since
Chapter XI cannot affect the rights of either secured creditors or equity holders it was impossi-
ble to have a valid Chapter XI plan of arrangment providing for the issuance of securities in
exchange for present "securities of" the debtor. Thus the words were of no effect. Apparently
the problem arose since the drafters copied § 393 verbatim from § 264. See 9 COLLIER at 657-
58.
42 11 U.S.C. § 793 (1970). Throughout the remainder of this paper §§ 264(a)(2) and
393(a)(2) will be refered to only as §§ 264 and 393.
0 S. REP. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 38-39 (1938). The House Report on the bill
contained the only reference to § 393.
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proceedings. Had the exemption been based on fairness alone, Con-
gress would not have drawn the distinction between securities issued
wholly or partly in exchange for claims and securities issued in the
same proceeding, subject to the same scrutiny, but wholly in exchange
for cash. Thus by merely examining the various statutory exemptions
and their respective legislative histories it is clear that the three ex-
emptions are not based on the same premise.
II. OPERATION OF THE THREE EXEMPTIONS IN THE
REORGANIZATION-ARRANGEMENT CONTEXT
In order to evaluate properly the functioning of the three exemp-
tions, it is important to note their similarities and limitations. It is
clear that the operation of the § 3(a)(10) exemption is premised upon
the presence of three necessary elements:
1) the securities to be issued must be issued wholly or partly in
exchange for present securities or claims of the debtor (the exchange
requirement);
2) all persons who are entitled to receive the securities must have
notice" of the required hearing and an opportunity to be heard (the
participation requirement); and
3) the court must approve the securities only after holding a hear-
ing on the fairness of the terms and conditions of the securities to
be issued (the fairness hearing requirement)."
While most of the discussions of § 3(a)(10) are concerned with issues
other than those involved in the reorganization context," the most
difficult theoretical questions involve determining the parameters of
the three basic requirements in reorganizations, how these require-
ments relate to the requirements of §§ 264 and 393, and whether §
3(a)(10) is an independent basis for exemption for securities issued
in Chapters X and XI.
A. The Exchange Requirement
1. Non-debtor Issuers
The exchange requirement is also a part of §§ 264 and 393.
" Notice is not a statutory requirement directly. However it was specifically required by
the SEC shortly after the act passed. See Securities Act Release No. 312 (March 15, 1935).
" See generally, I Loss, at 584-591; 4 Loss (Supp.) at 2597-2600; BLOOMENTHAL, SECURI-
TIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAw, § 4.14 (1974) [hereinafter cited as BLOOMENTHAL].
11 See, e.g., I CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. l 2171-2245.27 (1975); Glickman, The State
Administrative Fairness Hearing and Section 3(a)(1O) of the Securities Act-Some Questions,
45 ST. JOHN'S L. R. 644 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Glickman] and the authorities cited in note
45 supra.
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Unlike § 3(a)(10) which requires only that the security be issued "in
exchange for outstanding securities, claims, or property interests,
4 7
the exemptions in the Bankruptcy Act require that the securities be
issued pursuant to a plan or arrangement "in exchange for claims
against the debtor."4 The exchange requirement raises two general
problems. The first problem presented relates to identifying the of-
feror-i.e., can the issuer be a third party rather than the debtor
itself. Here the § 3(a)(10) legislative history is helpful. As previously
noted, the section was intended to apply "even though the original
issuer of the securities, debtor on the claims, or owner of the property
in which the interests are held, is not itself in the process of a reorgan-
ization."49 This history has lead one noted commentator to state flatly
that "there is no requirement of identity of the issuers."9" There are
no contrary cases or administrative rulings and the issue seems set-
tled.
Chapter X and § 264 are slightly different. It is clear that Chap-
ter X plainly contemplates the possibility that a new corporation
would be formed or that a totally independent third party would
participate in the proceedings and consolidate or merge the debtor
into it." Whether the exemption is available for securities of a totally
independent third party issued in exchange for claims against a
debtor is far less clear. Collier can be read as taking the position that
the exemption is available, although no authority is cited for this
position.52 Other commentators point to certain cases in which, they
argue, the SEC has implicitly recognized the exemption in this con-
text. 5
3
Chapter XI non-debtor issuers present more difficult problems.
Collier takes the position that the exemption is available,54 but fails
to take note of the vast differences between the protection-laden
provisions of Chapter X and the summary provisions of Chapter XI.
Based on these differences, and differences discussed below relating
to the fairness hearing, an impressive theoretical argument can be
15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1970).
S11 U.S.C. §§ 664, 793 (1970).
" H. R. REP. No. 1838, note 10 supra.
1 Loss at 585.
5, See 11 U.S.C. § 616(10) (1970).
" 9 COLLIER, at 658-59. Collier actually is silent on the reach of § 264 in this context. The
statement is made in the context of Chapter XI and § 393 and thus a fortiori should apply to
Chapter X.
13 Corotto, Debtor Relief Proceedings Under the Bankruptcy Act and the Securities Act
of 1933-The Registration Requirement and its Implications, 25 HASTINGs L. J. 389, 396-97
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Corotto].
" See note 49 supra.
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made that the § 393 exemption should not apply to the non-debtor
issuer in Chapter XI. 5
Two recent no-action letters reveal that the SEC has taken a far
more practical approach to the problem. In a letter involving Media
Creation, Ltd., the SEC stated that § 393 "relates only to to the
securities of the debtor itself."56 However, the letter went on to note
that several factors merited special consideration including the facts
that the stock was registered under § 12(g) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,17 that the securities were to be issued to a small num-
ber of people, and that they would bear a restrictive legend. Because
of these special factors no action was recommended by the Commis-
sion.18 A similar approach was taken in a more recent letter. There
the SEC waivered slightly by stating that the availability of the ex-
emption to a Chapter XI non-debtor issuer was an issue "not free of
doubt."59 In that transaction the SEC noted thatthe securities were
used for the acquisition of a bona fide business operation, contained
a restrictive legend, and that holders of the securities would cause the
company to become a reporting company under § 12(g). However, on
those facts the SEC was unwilling to give a no-action response."0 The
distinguishing factor seems to be the present availability of informa-
tion about the securities. Stock presently registered under § 12(g) may
be exempt, but stock to be registered under § 12(g) in the future will
not."'
A similar ad hoc approach to the availability of the exemption
can be seen in an unreported case involving Transystems, Inc.,6" in
which the SEC urged that § 393 must be interpreted "in the light of
the statutory policy [of Chapter XI], and that the exemption does not
necessarily extend to [non-debtor issuers]. '6 3 The Commission
argued that when faced with close questions, the pivotal factor before
the court should be whether the Commission will take future action.
Exactly what criteria would be used to determine the SEC position
in such close cases were not revealed, but the amount of information
See Corotto, supra note 53, at 397-403.
' SEC No Action Letter, Media Creation, Ltd., April 30, 1972.
" 15 U.S.C. § 78(g) (1970).
' SEC No. Action Letter, Media Creation, Ltd., April 30, 1972.
SEC No Action Letter, Data Graph, Inc., October 26, 1973.
"Id.
' The use of registration under § 12(g) as a determinative factor is not unique to this issue.
See 38 SEC ANN. REP. 126 (1972), where the Commission reports that it withdrew its objec-
tions to a plan of arrangement under Chapter XI when the debtor registered voluntarily under
§ 12(g).
n Discussed in 37 SEC ANN. REP. 199 (1971).
Id. (emphasis supplied).
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presently available seemed to be a key point.
At this point it should be noted that the ad hoc, "sometimes"
approach in these and other cases64 is a direct result of the conflict
between the approach of the 1933 Securities Act mandating disclo-
sure and the statutory framework of Chapter XI which does not
require such disclosure. Any imposition of a requirement of disclo-
sure-or a requirement of a minimum amount of information pub-
licly available-as a prerequisite for the § 393 exemption cannot be
based on the provisions of Chapter XL
2. The Value Exchanged
The other issue raised by the exchange requirement relates to
what the offeree must give up. All three exemptions contain similar
wording requiring the exchange to be at least partially for outstand-
ing securities, claims, or property interests.15 Thus, stock issued
wholly in exchange for cash (or some other type of new consideration)
is not exempt from the registration provision." Exactly when a secu-
rity is wholly worthless so that the exchange of the security plus cash
for new securities is equivalent to an exchange wholly for cash can
raise some difficult factual issues. Presumably, in a Chapter X pro-
ceeding, any time the corporation is insolvent in the bankruptcy
sense, any exchange by its equity holders of their stock plus cash in
exchange for new stock would not be exempt.17 The potential for
abuse of the exemption absent a strict enforcement of the exchange
requirement is clear." This abuse is not limited to Chapter X pro-
ceedings. On one occasion the SEC intervened in a Chapter XI pro-
"4 See also the two cases cited in 37 SEC ANN. REP. at 201 (1971) where the SEC
recognized the issue, but chose to side-step it by stressing certain deceptive practices rather than
the exemption itself.
15 It should be noted here that since Chapter XI proceedings can affect unsecured creditors
only (note 37 supra), the exemption in Chapter XI would not reach an exchange for a secured
claim or for stock.
66 SEC v. Century Inv. Transfer Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Sac. L.
REP. 93,232 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
6 But see 4 Loss (Supp. 1969) at 2599 where Loss quotes a case as holding that
[the insolvency of] a Chapter X debtor does not 'as a matter of law render the
debtor's shares of stock valuesless or deprive such shares of legal significance' so as
to destroy the exemption for new securities issued in consideration of the shares and
cash.
In the Matter of Bettinger Corp., No. 1019-60, (D. Mass., filed Oct. 31, 1961), affd on other
grounds sub nora., SEC v. Bloomberg, 299 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1962).
"s In SEC v. Bloomberg, the court in dealing with the exchange of the worthless stock of
insolvent corporations plus cash for new stock, stated: "One of the chief reasons they amended
the proceedings from an arrangement under Chapter XI to a reorganization under Chapter X
was to gain the exemption from registration." 299 F.2d at 319. Because of certain procedural
problems the alleged scheme may have worked.
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ceeding to stop the use of the proceeding by promoters "to manufac-
ture 'free' stock for themselves by putting assets into a dormant
corporation that happens to have wound up in Chapter X ' 69 The
Chapter XI exemption has also been used as part of a scheme to pass
the losses of creditors to the public by arranging to sell the securities
issued to the creditors to the public without registration.7°
Another aspect of this issue is the uncertainty of when a creditor
must acquire his claim against the debtor in order to meet the ex-
change requirement. In other words, can those acquiring claims
against the debtor during the Chapter X or XI proceedings (i.e., the
trustee, counsel, new creditors, etc.) exchange their claims for securi-
ties without registration? Section 3(a)(10) refers to "outstanding
claims" while §§ 264 and 393 refer only to "claims." The SEC's
"historic position" has been that post-petition creditors do not have
exchangeable claims within the meaning of §§ 264 and 393. 71 There
does not appear to be any case directly on point.72 While the question
is not free from doubt it is difficult to understand why the time at
which the debt accrued (assuming it is a bona fide debt) should have
any significant effect on the availability of the exemption. While the
priority which these post-petition creditors receive in Chapter X and
Chapter XI proceedings adequately protects them, there is no good
reason why these creditors cannot choose to forego the protections
and take their payment in stock of the reorganized company. To the
extent that the SEC's position is based on provisions of Chapters X
and XI other than §§ 264 and 393, or the historical practice of paying
these post-petition creditors in cash, perhaps a different result would
occur under § 3(a)(10). 73 The point is primarily theoretical since in
most cases the private offering exemption under § 4(2) of the Securi-
ties Act74 would be available.
It should also be noted that the exchange requirement is not an
absolute bar to the influx of new money, even new money represent-
ing an equity interest, in reorganization proceedings, since the reorg-
anization context is the type of situation which can fit neatly into the
private offering exemption of § 4(2). If § 4(2) and rule 146 75are fully
0 36 SEC ANN. REP. 198 (1970), where an unreported case involving Realsite, Inc. is
discussed.
7 See SEC v. Granco Products, Inc. 236 F. Supp. 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
7 See the Commission's discussion of an unreported case involving Realsite, Inc., 36 SEC
ANN. REP. 198 (1970).
72 See In re Jade Oil & Gas Co. discussed in Corotto, supra note 53, at 405 n.78 in which
the issue was raised but not resolved.
3 Id.
71 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1970).
11 Rule 146, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146.
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complied with, the initial issuance of stock would be exempt. While
it is impossible to know how extensively the § 4(2) exemption is used
in this context, it is quite apparent that its use is established and
accepted.
71
B. The Participation Requirement
As previously noted, § 3(a)(10) requires that the hearing must be
one "at which all persons to whom it is proposed to issue securities
in such exchange shall have the right to appear. . . -"I Implicit in
this right to appear is the right to have notice of the hearing. 7 What
type of notice is adequate varies with the facts and circumstances of
each case. Presumably the notice and participation requirements
would not present any questions more difficult than similar require-
ments in ordinary civil litigation. There are few court decisions in this
area other than those which hold the exemption not present where
there has been no hearing.7
Sections 264 and 393 do not expressly contain a full participa-
tion requirement. However, the purpose of the participation require-
ment is to establish a fair procedural mechanism for placing the
court's approval on the securities and both Chapter X and Chapter
XI have similar safeguards. In Chapter X proceedings, all interested
parties receive notice and have the right to participate both in the
hearing before the solicitation of acceptances and the hearing after
such solicitation. At both of these hearings the court approves the
plan."0 In Chapter XI proceedings the requirements are far less strin-
gent, but still impose similar notice and participation requirements.
In addition to a general notice section," there are requirements that
creditors receive notice of and have the right to participate in any
meeting at which a plan of arrangement could be confirmed." Thus
although §§ 264 and 393 do not contain express participation require-
ments like that contained in § 3(a)(10) such specific requirements are
unnecessary in view of the other sections of Chapters X and XI.
C. The Fairness Hearing
The chief difference between § 3(a)(10) and the bankruptcy ex-
76 See, e.g., 36 SEC ANN. REP. 198 (1970).
71 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1970).
7s SEC Securities Act Re. No. 312 (March 15, 1935).
7, See, e.g., Merger Mines Corp. v. Grismer, 137 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1943).
I 1I U.S.C. §§ 569, 571, 579 (1970).
S1 U.S.C. § 715 (1970).
I I U.S.C. §§ 735, 736 (1970); FED. BANK. R. 11-24.
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emptions is that § 3(a)(10) by its terms requires a hearing on the
fairness of the terms and conditions of the securities before the ex-
empt exchange can occur, while §§ 264 and 393 require only that the
exchange be pursuant to a plan or arrangement. 3 The absence of a
fairness hearing requirement creates a void which, unlike the partici-
pation requirement, is only partially filled by other sections of
Chapters X and XI. It is imperative in this context to distinguish
Chapter X from Chapter XI. Among the many protections built into
Chapter X is the requirement that the court find that the plan is "fair
and equitable and feasible." 4 On at least two separate occasions the
court must make this finding, 5 and the plan must be fair and equita-
ble for all interested parties and not only for accepting parties.8" Thus,
while the directly mandated judicial supervision of the fairness of the
terms and conditions of the securities is not present in Chapter X,
there must be judicial approval of the fairness of the plan in its
entirety, and if the issuance of securities is part of the plan, presuma-
bly the court must find that that part of the plan is fair also. Chapter
XI, however, is entirely different. As previously noted, the provisions
of Chapter XI sacrifice the protections of Chapter X for more speedy
and economical, but more limited relief. The major restriction upon
Chapter XI plans is the more limited "best interest of creditors"
test." Fairness, either to the creditors or to the public at large, is not
the statutory standard. Arguably this distinction between Chapter X
and Chapter XI plans places Chapter XI on an entirely different
theoretical basis from Chapter X plans and from the requirement of
§ 3(a)(10). Efforts to reconcile these three sections and to close the
loophole in Chapter XI created by the lack of qualitative standards
have resulted in several problems.
1. Judicial Scrutiny
Even under § 77B reorganizations, some courts noted the prob-
lem or reconciling the fairness test of § 3(a)(10) with what seemed a
more limited test in the reorganization context. Since the "fair and
91 It should be noted that these sections may in rare situations cause a question of exactly
when the exemption arises. The SEC's position with regard to both § 3(a)(10) and the bank-
ruptcy exemptions has been that the entire process of confirmation must be completed before
the securities may be issued. Thus for example, in the Chapter X context, no securities may be
issued until final confirmation under § 221. See SEC Securities Act Rel. No. 3000 (June 7,
1944).
- 11 U.S.C. §§ 574, 616 (1970). See note 31 supra.
- I I U.S.C. §§ 574, 579 (1970).
- 11 U.S.C. § 616(7)-(8) (1970) (emphasis supplied).
- II U.S.C. § 766 (1970). See note 38 supra.
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equitable" test was largely limited to the absolute (or at least relative)
priority rule even at this early date,"8 the court which first recognized
this problem attempted to reconcile the Bankruptcy and Securities
Acts by interpreting the word "feasible." The court in In re American
Department Stores Corp."9 noted:
It is the duty of the court to pass upon the feasibility of the plan of
reorganization. Although the plan were unopposed, the court should
not approve any feature fundamentally unsound. Especially when
: * * [the] securities when issued may be sold to the public. Congress
in subdivision (h) of section 77B . . . provided that: 'All securities
issued pursuant to any plan of reorganization confirmed by the
court. . . shall be exempt from all the provisions of the Securities
Act.' This imposes upon the courts the task of scrutinizing with care
securities to be issued under a plan of reorganization."
Without noting the inapplicability of the Chapters X and XI
exemptions to subsequent resales to the public,91 a fact upon which
the American Department Stores court seemed to rely heavily, this
language was picked up and relied upon in a Chapter X proceeding.
In In re Barium Realty Co.,9" the court stated:
Since securities issued pursuant to a plan or [sic] reorganization
under Chapter X are exempt from the registration requirements of
the Securities Act. . . , there is a certain burden thrust on the Court
to carefully scrutinize the proposed new securities and to reject any
plan of reorganization which proposes to issue securities of an un-
sound type. [quoting the above language from American Depart-
ment Stores.]"3
The SEC has cited this position a few times in its Chapter X reports
in analyzing the feasibility of various plans, but it has not emphasized
the position at all. Even when the SEC has cited the position, it has
relegated the argument to a footnote. 94
From these two cases and the oblique references by the SEC, the
leading commentators in the area have drawn a general rule that both
" Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913).
" In re American Dep't Stores Corp., 16 F. Supp. 977 (D. Del. 1936).
, Id. at 979-980.
" See the specific reference to the resale issue in the text accompanying note 43 supra.
The language of old § 77B(h) treated such resales as exempt. See text accompanying note 17
supra.
12 In re Barium Realty Co., 62 F. Supp. 81, (E.D. Mich. 1945), af'd, 154 F.2d 562 (6th
Cir. 1946).
13 62 F.Supp. at 88.
11 See Indiana Limestone Corp., 18 SEC 178, 196-7 n.28 (1945); Green River Steel Corp.
37 SEC 507, 526, n.18 (1957).
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Chapter X and Chapter XI courts have a duty to supervise closely
the fairness of the securities issued. 5 It has been argued that such
judicial scrutiny is "indispensible" in both Chapters X and XI."
There are two major problems with this approach. First, it
should be noted that no court has ever established an independent
statutory basis for this requirement. Although the statement is made
by courts, there is no statutory authority for imposing this added duty
on the court. Any security which is part of a plan which otherwise
complies with the statute should be exempt from registration regard-
less of any intrinsic fairness of the securities.
The second problem is that even assuming that such a duty is
required of a Chapter X court (based on fairness rather than feasibil-
ity), there is little ground for extending this duty to Chapter XI
proceedings. There is clearly a different and lesser approval standard
in Chapter XI. The "best interests of the creditors" test and the
"good faith" test do not really address themselves to the fairness of
the securities. One can easily imagine a situation where both these
tests are met, but the securities are less than fair, especially since it
may be in the creditors' interest to pass the stock off to the public
and realize a gain in this manner. While such distribution may not
be in the best interests of the public, it may comply with the "best
interests" test, and, if there is a legitimate purpose for the action, it
may also comply with the "good faith" test.
The SEC has argued on at least one occasion that the court-
recognized duty of scrutiny under Chapter X and § 264 should be
applied in Chapter XI under § 393. The SEC argued that "[t]o differ-
entiate one section from the other for this purpose would be to draw
a distinction without a difference. The words Congress used in the
two sections are identical. And so are the pertinent policy considera-
tions."' 7 As a general statement, the SEC's argument is not persu-
asive. It is true that nearly the same words are used in the two
exemptions, but the same tests were not used in the two chapters;
Chapter XI has a less stringent test. To say that the policy considera-
tions are the same does not advance analysis. As discussed below, the
policy considerations and what minimum disclosures, quantum of
fairness, etc., the chapters require is completely unclear. Moreover,
much of the force is taken from the statement when the context in
" 6A COLLIER at 1196; 11 H. REMINGTON, CORPORATE REORGANIZATION § 4582 at 348
(1961); 1 Loss at 585; 4 Loss (Supp. 1969) at 2599.
" Corotto, supra note 53, at 396.
'1 Letter from the SEC Division of Corporate Regulation to Referee James Yacos, regard-
ing Meter Maid Industries, Inc., January 14, 1971, at 5-6 [Hereinafter cited as Meter Maid
Letter].
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which it was made is understood. The SEC asserted the position
based on the Chapter XI good faith requirement. In the case in which
the statement was made there was a genuine issue of good faith in
that the debtor had "dissipated almost all of [its] assets and had
ceased doing business in any real sense.""8 The debtor was eventually
adjudicated bankrupt. The same basic facts are true of the other
unreported Chapter XI cases on which the SEC relied.9 The unique
circumstances of those cases do not support a general duty of court
scrutiny in Chapter XI cases. Absent a sham (i.e., an "arrangement
motivated primarily by stock market considerations rather than by
any serious desires to rehabilitate a business")"0 there is nothing in
the good faith test which imposes upon the courts a duty similar to
that imposed by the fairness and feasibility tests of Chapter X.
2. Standards of fairness and disclosure
By the explicit terms of § 3(a)(10), the court may only approve
the securities after a hearing on their "fairness." No such intrinsic
fairness is directly required by § 264 or § 393. Assuming that the SEC
and the commentators are right, and that there is some duty of super-
vision over the quality of the securities based on fairness, feasibility,
best interests of creditors, good faith, or even general policy, the
inquiry becomes what exactly is required?
Since all of these possible grounds for the court's duty go to the
value of the securities it would seem that the best way to infuse some
content into this amorphous duty of supervision would be to adopt
the standard of fairness used in § 3(a)(10). The chief problem with
this approach is that, after over forty years of experience with that
section, no explicit definition of fairness exists. The word does not
even carry any minimum content. The author has been unable to
locate any reported cases on what is required by the term (as opposed
to what is generally required to meet § 3(a)(10)). The SEC has issued
over ninety public no-action letters in the last four years in which the
fairness requirement of § 3(a)(10) is discussed. The requirement has
been discussed in terms of state and federal court hearings, and state
's 37 SEC ANN. REP. 202 (1971).
" The SEC cited three unreported cases in support of its argument. Meter Maid Letter
at 6 n.3. In the first case, United States Research Corp., the SEC intervened primarily because
of the misleading material disseminated to creditors rather than any need to enforce the court's
duty of scrutiny. 36 SEC ANN. REP. 197 (1970). In the second and third cases Universal Topics,
Inc., and Studio Creative Crafts, Inc., both debtors had little if any business and it appeared
that the proceedings were actually a sham. 37 SEC ANN. RaP. 202-03 (1971). All three corpora-
tions were eventually adjudicated bankrupt.
"'0 SEC ANNUAL REP. 203 (1971).
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and federal administrative hearings and in none of the letters is there
anything more than a paraphrase of the statutory requirement that
the appropriate body must look to the terms and conditions of the
securities. The leading commentators are equally unsatisfactory. 10
Perhaps, since "fairness" is such an amorphous and subjective
term, the lack of any substantive standards implicit in it should not
be surprising. Ultimately the fairness of any security will depend on
all the facts and circumstances surrounding its issuer and its issuance.
It is far easier to observe these facts and circumstances than to articu-
late them and explain why they lead to the decision that the terms of
the particular security are fair. On a theoretical level, however, at
least three problem areas are worth noting in an effort to make the
fairness standard more objective.
a. Suitability
Any fairness standard leads inevitably to the question of fairness
for whom. A security which is fair for a wealthy doctor who can
afford to take a high risk may not necessarily be equally fair for a
widow who needs low-risk, income-producing securities. While the
NASD 112 and SEACO'13 suitability rules are clearly inapplicable to
the issuer of securities, the more basic question of suitability cannot
be ignored in the Chapter X and Chapter XI context if fairness is
truly the requirement." 4
Securities are not fair and equitable in a vacuum. Who the po-
tential recipient of the securities will be is a factor which bears consid-
eration. In a slightly different context this has been a consideration
in the courts' struggling with the parameters of the Chapter X abso-
lute priority rule.0 5 While the needs of trade and other creditors
affected in a Chapter XI proceeding may tend to be more nearly
uniform, the needs of equity holders in a Chapter X proceeding (as-
suming solvency) are apt to be as diverse as the needs of all equity
holders in any corporation. This diversity points up the total impract-
I I Loss at 584-59; 4 Loss (Supp.) at 2498-2600; and BLOOMENTHAL at § 4.1413] all
discuss the § 3(a)(10) exemption without saying what must be met or even what type of proof
should be offered to show fairness.
l Art. III, § 2, NASD Rules of Fair Practice, CCH NASD MANUAL 91 2152.
'" 17 C.F.R. § 240.15(e)(2).
On the suitability doctrine in general see Cohen, The Suitability Rule and Econonfic
Theory, 80 YALE L.J. 1604 (1971); Fishman, Broker-Dealer Obligations to Customers-The
NASD Suitability Rule, 51 MINN. L. REv. 233 (1966); Mundheim, Professional Responsibili-
ties of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine, 1965 DUKE L. J. 445; Levin and Evan,
Professionalism and the Stockbroker: Some Observations on the SEC Special Study, 21 Bus.
LAw. 337 (1966).
" See Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
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icality of imposing a suitability requirement on an issuer, especially
one in reorganization where the offerees are fairly fixed. This how-
ever does not detract from the strength of the argument that, theoreti-
cally, suitability is an aspect of fairness. To a certain extent some of
the states have recognized this by imposing on certain securities the
restriction that they may only be purchased by persons with income
or net worth over a certain amount.' This is the position of the
Midwest Securities Commissioners Association. 107 While this income
minimum requirement is arguably not a true suitability standard, it
does represent the acceptance that theoretically some concept of suit-
ability is implicit in a fairness requirement.
b. Competence
As previously mentioned, the whole validity of the § 3(a)(10)
exemption rests on the ability of the relevant body to judge the fair-
ness of the security. This observation is equally true with all those
who make a fairness determination. Thus in the reorganization con-
text the relevant inquiry becomes whether the courts alone, or alter-
natively, the courts in conjunction with the SEC, are competent to
judge fairness of any security.
There are several problems with placing the fairness determina-
tion in the hands of the courts alone. Initially it should be noted that,
even assuming that all the men and women who make up the federal
bench are qualified jurists,' they are by definition generalists with
limited time to devote to the extensive supervision of the issuer
needed to insure that the securities are indeed fair.' Also, the adver-
sary context in which issues are raised and resolved in the federal
courts inherently limits the courts. They do not have the investigative
powers or experience necessary to make a full independent review of
the matter. An early commentator on the subject of whether the
courts or an administrative agency should make such a determination
', See, e.g., 1 OHIO SEC. BULL. (November 4, 1973).
" See, e.g., Statement of Midwest Securities Commissioners, Statement of Policy Re-
garding Real Estate Programs, 1 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 4821 (1975).
I" This is not to imply that all members of the federal bench have even an elementary
notion of the securities laws, quite the opposite may be true. For example the referee in a case
involving Greater Western Home Manufacturers, recently authorized the debtor to sell publicly
certain securities in its possession without registration since there was "no practical need" for
registration. Upon the SEC's rushing in and informing the court that the debtor was an
underwriter within the meaning of the Securities Act and that "practical need" was legally
irrelevant under the Act the referee vacated his order. 37 SEC ANN. REP. 201 (1971).
10 See Comment, Effect of Section 3(a)(1O) of the Securities Act as a Source of Exemption
for Securities Issued in Reorganizations, 45 YALE L.J. 1050, 1075 (1936) [hereinafter cited as
45 YALE L.J.].
COMMENTS
argued quite persuasively that only administrative agencies, and not
the courts, are competent to judge the fairness of the terms and
conditions of the issuance of securities."'
To a certain extent Congress must have agreed with this analysis
since it provided the court with a qualified advisor, the SEC, to assist
the court in reorganizations and arrangements carried out under
court supervision."' In Chapter X proceedings the SEC plays a major
role. The SEC may participate as one of the parties although it has
no independent right of appeal from court orders."2 In most cases the
SEC must be kept informed and the court may not approve a plan
unless the SEC has made its report or informed the court that it will
not do so."' The SEC presents its views and recommendations on
such matters as the qualifications and independence of trustees and
their counsel, sales of properties and other assets, fee allowances to
the various parties, including the trustees and their counsel, and other
financial or legal matters. However, the most important role of the
SEC in Chapter X proceedings is its assistance in the formulation of
plans of reorganization in compliance with all the statutory restric-
tions.' It operates to protect the public interest and as a true "friend
of the court.""' In Chapter X the SEC has a broad role, "custom-
tailored to meet the needs of reporting on management ineptitude or
indiscretions." 6
The SEC's role in Chapter XI proceedings is far less extensive.
For the first two years of the Act it had no clearly defined role.
However, in 1940 the Supreme Court held that the SEC had standing
to apply to the court for a dismissal of the Chapter XI proceeding
where the SEC believed that the case should have been brought under
Chapter X. 117 The 1952 amendments codified this position by adding
M0 45 YALE L.J. 1075-76.
"I 11 U.S.C. §§ 572, 608 (1970).
112 11 U.S.C. § 608 (1970).
113 11 U.S.C. §§ 572-575 (1970).
M On the role of the SEC in Chapter X proceedings in addition to those authorities
directly quoted see generally Frank, Epithetical Jurisprudence and the Work of the Securities
and Exchange Commission in the Administration of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, 18
N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 317 (1941) [hereinafter cited as Frank]; and Windle, The Securities and
Exchange Commission and Corporate Reorganizations Under Chapter X, 34 REF. J. 37 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Windle].
Mls Herzog, Reorganizations and Arrangements Under Chapter X and XI: Problems of
Administration from the Standpoint of the Court, 35 REF. J. 113, 116 (1961).
"I Katskee, The Calculus of Corporate Reorganization; Chapter X v. XI and the Role of
the SEC Assessed, 45 AM. BANKR. L.J. 171, 192 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Katskee].
"I SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940). This was only
the second case in which the SEC took the position that it had a right to make such a motion.
The issue was side-stepped in an earlier case. 6 SEC ANN. REP. 55 n.1 (1940).
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§ 328 to Chapter XI which expressly granted this right to the SEC.18
A review of the annual reports of the period reveals that from 1940
to 1954 this right was seldom fully exercised. Beginning in 1955, in
response to what it considered the "increasing frequency" of the
abuse of Chapter XI by its use by debtors with widely held securities,
the SEC began to intervene in more Chapter XI proceedings.' Dur-
ing the period from 1940 to 1970 the SEC confined its role largely
to making the § 328 motion to transfer the proceedings to Chapter
X.2 0 This far more limited role still involved some administrative
action since a full investigation of the debtor was often necessary in
order to compile the information necessary to convince the court that
the proceedings should be transferred to Chapter X.121 Dring this
period the SEC began to recognize that Chapter XI proceedings were
being used to attempt to escape the various provisions of the securi-
ties statutes. Around 1970 the SEC began to intervene not only to
make the § 328 transfer motion, but also to point out deceptive prac-
tices, misuse of securities exemptions, and other securities law viola-
tions.122 Thus, although the SEC's role in Chapter XI proceedings is
expanding, it is still far less significant than its role in Chapter X.
The extent to which the SEC participates in these proceedings
greatly effects the competence of the court to judge the fairness of
any security. There is no requirement in § 3(a)(1 0) that anyone except
the parties directly in interest be accorded the right to participate in
the fairness hearing. Indeed, absent leave of court, the SEC would
11 U.S.C. § 728 (1970). See also FED. BANK. R. 11-15.
21 SEC ANN. REP. 93 (1955).
During this period (and up to the present) the SEC consistently explained its limited
role in Chapter XI proceedings with the following statement:
Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act provides a procedure by which debtors can
effect arrangements with respect to their unsecured debts under court superivision.
Where a proceeding is brought under that chapter but the facts indicate that it should
have been brought under Chapter X, Section 328 of Chapter XI authorizes the
Commission or any other party in interest to make application to the court to dismiss
the Chapter XI proceeding unless the debtor's petition is amended to comply with
the requirements of Chapter X, or a creditor's petition under Chapter X is filed.
See, e.g., 35 SEC ANN. REP. 170-171 (1969).
2 Katskee at 193-4.
" Since 1970 the SEC annual report has carried the following statement with minor
variations in addition to the one quoted in note 120 supra:
Attempts are sometimes made to misuse Chapter XI so as to deprive investors
of the protections which the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934
are designed to provide. In such cases the Commission's staff normally attempts to
resolve the problem by informal negotiations. If this proves fruitless, the Commis-
sion intervenes in the Chapter XI proceeding to develop an adequate record and to
direct the court's attention to the applicable provisions of the Federal securities laws
and their bearing on the particular case.
See, e.g., 38 SEC ANN. RaP. 126 (1970).
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be hard pressed to demonstrate its standing in a pure § 3(a)(10)
hearing. Since "the courts do not appear to be particularly well
adapted to accomplish by direct supervision what the Securities Act
was intended to achieve,"' and since administrative agencies with
expertise, such as the SEC, appear to be "better suited to perform
this function than the courts," 12u the ability of the courts alone to
exempt securities that are fair seems highly questionable. In the
Chapter X context the court's ability is considerably enhanced by the
participation of the SEC. However, such participation is not manda-
tory in all cases and may be declined even where mandated.1 5 In a
Chapter XI proceeding, participation by the SEC is totally within its
discretion. Undoubtedly its participation in Chapter X proceedings,
and to a greater extent, its participation in Chapter XI proceedings,
is restricted by its limited resources and desire to eliminate other
more blatant and less complex evils.'26 Thus there is considerable
doubt as to whether the present ChapterX court, much less the pres-
ent Chapter XI court, is competent to find the requisite fairness.
c. Minimum Disclosure
Assuming that securities issued in reorganizations and arrange-
ments must meet some standard of fairness, another question arises:
how much, if any, financial disclosure is mandated by the fairness
requirement? In other words, is it possible for a court to determine
the fairness of the security unless the court is apprised of the requisite
financial data? Obviously some disclosure must be made to the court.
However, a court is essentially a passive body accustomed to deciding
questions presented in an adversary setting rather than actively super-
vising an independent investigation. Thus, the issue is more appropri-
ately characterized as how much information must the debtor provide
the offerees of the securities and in what form must this information
be provided so that the offerees may formulate a position on the
fairness of the securities and present that position to the court."21
1" 45 YALE L.J. at 1075.
1U Id.
M, I I U.S.C. §§ 572, 573 (1970).
1 See Frank at 349 where he explains the SEC's self-imposed limitations in Chapter X
proceedings.
The volume of reorganization litigation is great, and except in cases where appear-
ance is made at the judge's request, the Commission, therefore seeks to enter those
cases in which its facilities are most needed and will be most useful.
See also Windle at 38.
W The analysis ignores the impact of the antifraud rules as requiring a minimum of
disclosure. See note 14 supra.
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The decision which the court must make, that the securities
issued meet some fairness requirement, is directly analogous to the
duty imposed on several state blue sky administrators. Thus, the type
and format of information which they require the issuer to furnish
to them should provide some insight into what information should be
brought out in Chapter X and Chapter XI proceedings. For example,
under the Ohio blue sky law,' among other things, for those securi-
ties registered by qualification,' the Division of Securities must de-
termine that "the proposed offer or disposal of securities is not on
grossly unfair terms."' 30 The Division requires a large amount of
detailed financial information in order to make this determination.
Among other things the application for registration must disclose the
actual purpose and character of the business, the use of proceeds, the
business experience of all directors and officers, the amount of securi-
ties they hold and compensation they earn, the identity of all benefi-
cial owners of more than ten percent of the voting shares, a certified
balance sheet and profit and loss statement for the last fiscal year
along with unaudited ones for a period since then, and projected
financial statements for the next five years covering cash flow, profit
and loss, as well as full balance sheets.' With this information in
hand, the Division begins to judge the fairness of the issue. This
information may then be supplemented by additional disclosures as
the situation requires. Similar information is required by other blue
sky administrators who are charged with enforcing a fairness stan-
dard.'
It is clear that the fairness standard requires that some informa-
tion be furnished to the court (and therefore to all interested parties)
but, unlike the blue sky administrators, the court lacks specific disclo-
sure guidelines. The advisory role of the SEC would appear to be
helpful here. Jerome Frank in an article written when he was chair-
man of the SEC explained how the SEC viewed its role in assisting
the Chapter X court in the court's fairness determinations by seeing
to it that the court received certain information:
Our emphasis on the feasibility of the plan fits in with other duties
"1 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1707.01-.99 (Page 1964).
In Basically unless the security is exempt, (§ 1707.02) the transaction is exempt, (§ 1707.03)
or the security qualifies as one that may be registered by description (§ 1707.06) it must be
registered by qualification (§ 1707.09).
" 0 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.07 (Page 1964).
"I Ohio Division of Securities Form 9.
lu See, e.g., the practice under the California statute described in H. MARSH and R.
VOLK, PRACTICE UNDER THE CALIFORNIA SECURITIES LAW, 8-1 to 8-92 (1944) and the forms
included in volume 2, at. A-2-12 to A-2-26.
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of the Commission .... The absence, in the solicitation of accept-
ances to reorganization plans, of the registration statement and
prospectus devices by which disclosure is made under the Securities
Act is compensated only partially by provisions of Chapter X ...
[N]either the Commission's report nor such other information [as
is required by Chapter X] ordinarily contains information as ade-
quate as is contained in a prospectus which complies with the Secur-
ities Act. . . . Since the basis of the exemption from registration
is the assumption that the judge who approves and confirms the plan
will provide the necessary supervision of the securities to safeguard
investors, we feel that it is our duty to urge upon the court the
necessity for appropriate labelling of securities, for full and com-
plete disclosure, and for preventing the issuance of securities which
are in themselves deceptive or patently unsound."'
Thus, early in its history the SEC seems to have taken the posi-
tion that not just disclosure, but full disclosure, was an inseparable
part of fairness. The value of disclosure in reorganizations was at
least implicitly recognized by the Supreme Court when it quoted
favorably from the Tenth Circuit American Trailer Rentals case. In
discussing the plan, the court stated:
[I]f the stock involved here were not part of an arrangement, the
disclosures made with regard to it would be clearly inadequate. No
authority has been found which would indicate that recipients of
stock issued in connection with an arrangement are not entitled to
as much information as are those persons acquiring stock under
ordinary conditions.13
In that case the Tenth Circuit had held that "If it appears, for the
protection of those being solicited to accept the plan, additional infor-
mation is necessary, the Court should so order.""13 Both courts im-
plicitly recognized that the disclosures made in that case complied
with the explicit disclosure provisions of the bankruptcy statute, but
were inadequate for other reasons. These reasons must relate to some
required minimum disclosure mandated by some fairness require-
ment.
Thus, the authorities indicate that some disclosure is necessary,
but exactly how much is unclear. "Full and complete disclosure"
equal to that available to persons "acquiring stock under ordinary
circumstances" cannot realistically be read as requiring the full tech-
'" Frank at 346-47 (emphasis supplied).
'm SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594, 615-16 (1965) quoting 325 F.2d
47, 53 (10th Cir. 1963).
"" In re American Trailer Rentals Co., 325 F.2d 47, 53 (10th Cir. 1963) rev'd on other
grounds sub nom., SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594 (1965).
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nical equivalent to a standard registration statement. The purpose of
financial disclosure is to educate the consumer so that he (either alone
or with professional advice) may make an informed investment deci-
sion.'36 The particular use of such information in reorganizations and
arrangements is only a variant of this. Hence, there should be enough
basic financial information about the debtor and the debtor's future
furnished to all the potential recipients of the securities to enable
them to make an informed decision on whether or not to accept the
plan. Compliance with registration-type technical details would only
be counterprodcutive 3 7
It must be noted, however, that the informed investment decision
in the reorganization context does not inevitably lead to the same
result as an informed investment decision in a more normal invest-
ment context. Normally, the investment decision is an individual
decision having immediate effects only on the individual. However,
the decision made by those participating in Chapter X or Chapter XI
proceeding is a group or class decision. Hence, it is not totally realis-
tic to speak of an individual informed investment decision (to accept
or reject a plan) since the individual will be bound by a two-thirds
vote of his class in Chapter X and a majority vote of his class in
Chapter XI. Therefore, an informed individual may be at the mercy
of a class which chooses to make an uninformed or unwise decision.
The fairness of this forced "investment decision" may certainly be
questionable. This, however, is not a function of the securities policy
mandating disclosure, but rather a result of the pecularities of the
bankruptcy procedure and does not detract from the general need for
adequate disclosure.
Since such disclosure is a necessary element of the fairness stan-
dard, there should be specific statutory provisions for it. Chapter X
contains a number of sections relevant to disclosure. The trustee is
required to file a plan of reorganization or a report stating why no
plan can be filed."3 8 The SEC also usually files a report including its
analysis of the plan. 3 ' After the plan is approved by the court as
meeting the required standards, the plan and the SEC report, along
with "such other matters as the judge may deem necessary or desira-
ble for the information of creditors and stockholders,"'' 0 is mailed to
'u See generally Sommer, Random Thoughts on Disclosure as "Consumer" Protection,
27 Bus. LAW. 85 (1971).
"3 Indeed it would probably be impossible. See, e.g., Schneider, Nits, Grits, and Soft
Information in SEC Filings, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 254 (1972). [hereinafter cited as Schneider].
I- II U.S.C. § 567, 569 (1970).
13 11 U.S.C. § 572 (1970).
1 11 U.S.C. § 575 (1970).
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all parties in interest. Only after the information is mailed may ac-
ceptances be solicited. 4 1
These provisions in most cases would probably meet any disclo-
sure standards imposed. The SEC investigation is thorough and re-
sults in a comprehensive report.1 12 In some cases, the result is better
than that which a potential investor would otherwise get. As a matter
of course the SEC reports discuss valuation of the enterprise. The
value of the enterprise and its future earning potential are perhaps
the most critical factors of interest to potential investors, and it is just
this information in this direct form which investors are denied by the
normal registration statement.14 3 The investor wants to know if the
security is a "good buy" and that is exactly what the SEC report is
designed to tell him. In some ways, the SEC report is a direct answer
to the request of some commentators for limited recommendations
on securities.'
The provisions of Chapter XI are far less conducive to adequate
disclosure. If the SEC participates at all, it is on a far more limited
basis. In almost all cases the debtor remains in possession, and thus
the debtor has greater control over the flow of information. The
arrangement process is essentially one of negotiation between the
debtor and its major creditors. While there is a potential vehicle for
disclosure to the creditors in the power of elected creditors' commit-
tees to examine the debtor's affairs, negotiate, and make reports to
other creditors,' the extent to which these powers are exercised de-
pends entirely on the creditors. There is no statutory requirement for
an independent investigation, for any minimum disclosure or for any
formal report to all creditors. In fact, acceptances of the debtor's plan
may even be solicited before the first meeting of creditors and thus
before formal creditors' committees can be elected to investigate the
debtor. 4 ' Routinely, Chapter XI acceptances are solicited without
judicial scrutiny over the methods used and information disclosed. 147
Plans are also often confirmed without full disclosure of the relevant
financial data to the court.' This is undoubtedly due, at least in part,
"I 11 U.S.C. § 576 (1970).
142 See Windle at 38, 39-41, Katskee at 192, and especially Frank at 335-36.
10 See generally Schneider, and also Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths
and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1151 (1970).
"I Joslin, Federal Securities Regulation from the Small Investors' Prospective, 6 J. PUB.
L. 219 (1957).
I's 11 U.S.C. §§ 936(3), 939 (1970).
I, 11 U.S.C. § 936(4) (1970).
"' See Transystems Inc., an unreported case cited in 37 SEC ANN. REP. 199 (1971) and
quoted in Corotto, supra note 53, at 395 n.28.
I" No less an authority than Louis Loss has speculated that "the court in approving a plan
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to the lesser standards for confirmation of the plan used in Chapter
XI. 49 This does not mean that the disclosure is any less a requirement
in Chapter XI than in Chapter X, but only that it is being ignored.
American Trailer Rentals, the only case in which a court of appeals
recognized this duty of disclosure, was a Chpater XI case. Thus,
although Chapter X meets the disclosure requirements, Chapter XI,
both in theory and in practice, cannot measure up to the required
disclosure standards.
d. The Use of § 3(a)(10) in Chapter X and Chapter XI.
The traditional approach to the use of § 3(a)(10) in Chapter X
and Chapter XI proceedings has been that as long as its provisions
could be met the exemption was available. The thought was often
expressed that "[i]t is quite clear that the exemption of section
3(a)(10) covers the issuance of securities while the debtor is under the
auspices of the court in X and XI."15 However, in view of several
current no-action letters this position is clearly contrary to that taken
by the SEC. Thus, while the traditional position is not clearly wrong,
it will no longer go uncontested.
Initially it must be decided what difference it makes if § 3(a)(10)
is unavailable in Chapters X and XI. It makes little if any practical
difference in Chapter X. A review of the material discussed above
shows that, for most purposes, § 264 as interpreted requires every-
thing that § 3(a)(10) requires. Compliance with both exemptions is
achieved in the same manner. However the discussion above indicates
that it may make a difference with Cahpter XI proceedings. Despite
the questionable authority to the contrary, compliance with the provi-
sions of Chapter XI, especially § 393, does not automatically insure
compliance with § 3(a)(10). Since Chapter XI is the "dominant reorg-
anization vehicle," the question of the relevance of § 3(a)(10) in Chap-
ter XI is more than academic.
Despite a number of early SEC administrative pronouncements
that seemed to imply that § 393 and § 3(a)(10) were independent
alternatives available to the Chapter XI debtor, that is clearly not the
of arrangement may be thinking more about disposing of its docket than of the protection of
investors." ALI PROPOSED FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 51l(e), Comment 2 (1972).
"I In In re American Trailers Rentals the court after holding that additional information
should be disclosed noted that "It may be that even without the additional information, the
arrangement would still be in the 'best interest of creditors' . . ." 325 F.2d at 53.
"I Salter, Exemption of Securities from Registration Issued Under Chapters X and XI,
76 CoM. L.J. 6, 8 (1971). See also 1 Loss at 584,4 Loss (Supp.) at 2598; BLOOMENTHAL at 4-
148 to 4-149; Corotto, supra note 53, generally, but see Corotto at 408.
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present SEC position.' The SEC has stated that in its view § 3(a)(10)
is
drawn in somewhat more general terms than the exemptive provi-
sions incorporated in Section 393 of Chapter XI, because they
would be applicable to a wide range of proceedings under various
federal or state laws. But they apply essentially the same standards,
in substantially the same language as Section 393. . . . We, there-
fore, regard Section 393 of the bankruptcy act as a specific
application of the previously enacted Securities Act exemptions to
the Chapter XI context, and conclude that, in Chapter XI proceed-
ings, corresponding Securities Act exemptions must be construed to
conform to the more specific terms of Section 393.152
In later no-action letters the SEC stated that § 3(a)(10) "was
superseded by Section 393 in the Chapter XI context,"'5 and that
"any failure to conform to the requirements of such proceedings
cannot be cured by resort to another Act. A contrary construction
would render Sections 264a and 393a superfluous and would nullify
the particular limitations on their use as stated [in Chapters X and
XI].' 5' This position has been restated several times recently and
appears to be firmly entrenched. 55
The SEC's "superseded by" and "specific application of" ration-
ale are questionable on theoretical grounds. Surely there is nothing
in the legislative history which would call for such a narrow interpre-
tation. The drafters of § 3(a)(10) surely thought it would apply in the
reorganization context since they made specific reference to it in the
reports.' Also, §§ 264 and 293 were taken directly from the old §
7713(h) which predated the present version of § 3(a)(10). 15 1
From a practical standpoint, it is difficult to see why the SEC
has pushed this position in Chapter XI, especially in view of the fact
that the fairness standard is explicit in § 3(a)(10) while only implicit,
if existing at all, in Chapter XI. This is especially true in view of an
easier, but more technical way of reaching the same result with Chap-
ter XI proceedings. Section 3(a)(10) states that the securities are
"I See, e.g., SEC No Action Letter, Seaferro, Inc., (March 23, 1971) [1971-72 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,097; SEC Securities Release No. 3011 (August 28, 1944).
"I SEC No Action Letter, Sequential Information Systems, Inc. (December 4, 1972).
(emphasis supplied).
" SEC No Action Letter, Data Graph, Inc. (October 26, 1973) (emphasis supplied).
15 SEC No Action Letter, O'Neill Bondholders Committee (June 17, 1974).
" See SEC No Action Letters, Arby's Inc. (March 1, 1974); Miller-Wohl Co. (August
30, 1973) and Transmagnetics, Inc. (May 21, 1973).
' See text accompanying notes 8-12 supra.
'5 See text accompanying notes 16, 43 supra.
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exempt from registration if they are issued in exchange for other
securities and claims, but only after the fairness hearing. Unlike
Chapter X, in Chapter XI the acceptances to the plan are solicited
before and as a condition precedent to the court's judgment that the
plan meets all the requisite criteria. Since the solicitation of accept-
ances cannot be exempt from the registration provisions of § 5 until
after the hearing, it is doubtful that the confirmation hearing of
Chapter XI, which is the first time the court passes on the plan, could
double as the fairness hearing.'58 Thus, a strong argument can be
made that § 3(a)(10) should be unavailable in Chapter XI as a routine
matter.
Perhaps the SEC feared that Chapter XI courts would conduct
a separate non-statutory hearing to which all parties would have
notice before acceptances were solicited. Technically this would seem
to comply with § 3(a)(10). However, the SEC has taken the position
that such a hearing would be ultra vires and therefore not within the
exemption. In a straight bankruptcy case involving the sale of securi-
ties which otherwise would require registration,'59 the SEC stated its
position that the § 3(a)(10) exemption was unavailable.
The Division is aware that Section 3(a)(10) does not require
that a court, as distinguished from an administrative agency, be
'expressly authorized' to make such a [fairness] finding. But a court
can act judicially only within its sphere of jurisdiction, and we re-
main of the view that a court of bankruptcy lacks jurisdiction to
pass upon the terms and conditions upon which securities are to be
issued by a purchaser at a bankruptcy sale. Consequently, it is our
view that an order by a bankruptcy court cannot meet the require-
ments of Section 3(a)(10).60
The SEC's ultra vires doctrine cannot possibly be founded on
any notion of judicial competence since the same court which super-
vises the issuances of securities in Chapter X (usually assisted by the
SEC) and Chapter XI (usually unassisted by the SEC) would super-
"' See Corotto, supra note 53, at 408; See also SEC No Action Letter, Fidelity Finance
Corp. (May 2, 1973) [1972-73 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 78,840, where the
SEC refused to recommend no action on the availability of § 3(a)(10) when a state Commission
made what would otherwise be an adequate fairness determination after a merger was finalized
but before it was complete and before any stock was issued.
15, Although the facts of the situation are unclear a similar situation giving rise to the need
for registration of securities before sale in a straight bankruptcy proceeding would occur
whenever the debtor was a control person and the purchasers could not fit within any other
exemption.
Io SEC No Action Letter, O'Neill Bondholders Committee, Reconsideration (August 9,
1974). See also O'Neill Bondholders Committee (June 17, 1974).
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vise their issuance in straight bankruptcy. Indeed, the SEC has recog-
nized that state court judges (who may be totally unfamiliar with the
federal securities law) can conduct the fairness hearing."6' Rather, it
is more likely that the SEC's concern is that permitting any court to
hold the fairness hearing absent some statutory basis for it would
open the door to potential abuses.
However, the SEC itself has been partially responsible for the
growth of this potential abuse. In late 1971, the SEC issued a no-
action letter stating that the issuance of stock to a class of sharehold-
ers in settlement of an action based on the Securities Act was exempt
where the court held a hearing on the fairness of the proposed settle-
ment.' Shortly thereafter a similar letter relating to stock warrants
was issued.' In slightly over three years since then, the SEC has
issued twenty-three such letters for similar federal class actions and
derivative suits, most of them based on the Securities Acts. While the
rationale for these letters is seldom discussed, the only possible way
to distinguish the court's fairness hearing in these cases from a possi-
ble additional hearing in the Chapter XI context is the presence of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(e) and 23.1 .164 Both of these rules
impose upon the court a duty to approve all settlements.
Two things should be noted about the court settlement exception
to the ultra vires doctrine. The court duty is imposed by a civil rule
rather than by statute. If a civil rule is sufficient authority upon which
to premise a fairness hearing, several questions arise. Would a local
rule of court also be sufficient? If not, how can a local rule be distin-
guished from the federal rule? If so, what is left of the general ultra
vires doctrine? These questions point up the potential breadth of this
part of the § 3(a)(10) exemption.
More importantly for the reorganization context is that the rule
itself does not require any independent verification of fairness. The
criteria used for approving a court settlement may be far different
than the criteria used for approving the fairness of securities. In
approving a settlement, the court may be far less likely to impose its
own judgment and may be more favorably inclined to the compro-
, See SEC No Action Letter, Black Steer of America, Inc. (April 12, 1972).
,2 SEC No Action Letter, VTR, Inc. (October 8, 1971) [1971-72 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 78,518.
16 SEC No Action Letter, LIN Broadcasting Corp. November 8, 1972) [1972-73 Trans-
fer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 79,154.
M Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 relating to class actions reads in part:
(e) A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of
the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all
members of the class in such manner as the court directs.
Federal Rule 23.1 relating to derivative actions reads in the same manner.
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mise which the parties have achieved." 5 However, it is just this inde-
pendent judgment which the § 3(a)(10) exemption and any true fair-
ness decision contemplates. It should also be noted that any approval
of the securities to be issued in settlement will be made by the court
alone and, as has already been noted, the competence of any court
acting alone to make the fairness determination is subject to question.
Some courts realizing this have requested the assistance of an already
overburdened SEC in evaluating such settlements. 6 '
This complex maze of SEC doctrine with § 3(a)(10) being su-
perseded by § 393, the unavailability of § 3(a)(10) in ordinary bank-
ruptcy, but availability in class action and derivative suits before the
same district court judge is difficult to reconcile on theoretical
grounds if fairness alone is considered. The one recurring note run-
ning through all of these variations on the § 3(a)(10) theme is that
the SEC is primarily concerned with disclosure rather than fairness.
Section 393 supersedes § 3(a)(10) not because its qualitative standards
are more rigid (on the contrary they probably are weaker), but rather
because the SEC believes that Chapter XI imposes greater practical
disclosure standards than does § 3(a)(10). The ability of the court to
supervise the fairness of the sale of securities in ordinary bankruptcy
does not really differ from its ability to supervise the fairness of class
action settlement, but the amount of disclosure probably does differ.
In class action suits, especially those involving violations of the secur-
ities acts, there most probably has been extensive discovery and the
offerees have discovered the information necessary to make an in-
formed investment decision. The same amount of disclosure is less
likely to come forward in the ordinary bankruptcy context.
It is submitted that the only way to understand the SEC's posi-
tion in these various matters is to realize that fairness is an impossible
goal. Its subjective nature does not easily translate into rules enforce-
able by courts. Disclosure, on the other hand, is a more objective goal
and one with which the SEC has much experience. Thus even though
fairness is the § 3(a)(10) standard, the SEC formulates its position by
focusing on the amount of disclosure rather than any concept of
fairness.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS WITHIN THE PRESENT SECURITIES AND
BANKRUPTCY ACTS
No less an authority than Louis Loss has stated that §§ 264 and
"I On the court's practice in this area see generally 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACrICE
23,8014], 23.12412].
"I8 See Norman v. McKee 290 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
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393 of the Bankruptcy Act "add nothing to section 3(a)(10)."'11 Other
noted commentators have echoed this and have referred to the two
bankruptcy sections as "express duplicative exemptions." 6' The one
thing which the above analysis should make clear is that the three
sections are not identical. They impose similar, but still distinct re-
quirements. Their application has had different practical results. In
Chapter X, the quality of the securities and the amount of disclosure
must meet high standards. In Chapter XI, the quality standards are
weaker. In Chapter XI, the disclosure standards are judicial rather
than statutory, of recent origin, seldom really imposed and thus of
little practical benefit. If there is a theoretical and practical loophole
in the securities exemptions, it is in the distribution of large amounts
of unregistered securities by the use of Chapter XI by corporate
issuers. No amount of judicial action based upon SEC urging will
totally fill this gap. Thus even assuming the retention of the present
Bankruptcy and Securities Acts two major changes should be made.
First, § 3(a)(10) should be repealed. It serves no function in
bankruptcy and its use in other contexts is questionable. Its use by
state agencies has been infrequent'69 and criticized. 70 Its use in court
settlements is of very recent origin and amounts to little more than a
means to sidestep the requirements of rule 146. To the extent that it
has any independent use, perhaps the exemption for insurance, bank-
ing and similar agencies should be retained. However, the need for
exemption in those areas presents no justification for a broad exemp-
tion covering other situations. Tying the exemption to a fairness
hearing is unrealistic. The concept of fairness is foreign to the federal
securities statutes. It is an amorphous goal. Neither the SEC nor the
courts have any practicable way of achieving it.
Second, the disclosure requirements of both Chapters X and XI
need to be strengthened since judicial supervision is a questionable
"' I Loss at 584, Loss's misunderstanding of Chapter XI can be easily understood. At
the time of the first edition of his work on securities both Chapter X and Chapter XI contained
fair and equitable standards. Because of this identical standard he thought the exemptions were
equal, and his statement that § 264 and § 393 add nothing to § 3(a)(10) can be traced to his
1951 edition. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION, 369-70 (1951 ed.). This statement was carried
forward in the 1961 edition even though the standards in Chapter XI had been changed. I Loss
at 584. It was not until the 1969 Supplement that any distinction was recognized and then the
matter was left open. 4 Loss (Supp.) at 2598. Unfortunately the analysis in the 1961 edition
has been picked up and frequently cited.
"' BLOOMENTHAL at 4-149 n.440.
, Only three states have statutes allowing such action: California, Oregon, and Ohio.
CALIF. CORP. CODE § 25142 (West Supp. 1973); ORE. REV. STAT. § 59.095 (1974); OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 1707.04 (Page 1964).
' See, e.g., Glickman at 648-55, 663-64.
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substitute for administrative investigation. In those Chapter X cases
in which the SEC chooses not to participate and in most Chapter XI
cases there is no one to represent the public interest. The public may
well be able to protect itself, but only if it has the requisite informa-
tion. There are several ways this could be accomplished, two of which
are discussed below.
The securities exemptions should be moved from the Bankruptcy
Act and placed in the Securities Act under § 4, the exempt transac-
tions section. Alternatively, they could be treated under a variant of
§ 3(b), but without the $500,000 limitation. 7' Either of these amend-
ments would have the advantage of putting the exemptions within the
SEC's rule making power. 172 In such a posture the SEC could more
efficiently regulate the issuance of reorganization securities. It could
establish rules governing disclosure, setting minimum filing require-
ments, etc. The exemption would then be more flexible with the
possibility of change as the situation demanded it. The use of the no-
action letter policy would also be an advantage. Another possibility
would be to require the debtor in all cases (both Chapters X and XI)
to furnish certain minimum information to all interested parties be-
fore acceptances could be solicited. The availability of the informa-
tion could be a criterion for approval. As a prerequisite to any confir-
mation the court would have to make as a specific finding of fact that
adequate financial information was given to all parties. The adequacy
of the information could be an appealable question thus bringing the
issue sharply into focus before the appellate courts.
171 § 3(b), 11 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1970) states that
The Commission may from time to time by its rules and regulations and subject to
such terms and conditions as may be prescribed therein, add any class of securities
to the securities exempted as provided in this section, if it finds that the enforcement
of this subchapter with respect to such securities is not necessary in the public interest
and for the protection of investors by reason of the small amount involved or the
limited character of the public offering, but no issue of securities shall be exempted
under this subsection where the aggregate amount at which such issue is offered to
the public exceeds $500,000.
If the SEC has power to exempt a whole class of securities it has power to exempt only a
transaction in these securities. For a recent application of § 3(b) and this transactional exemp-
tion see rule 240, 17 .C.F.R. 230.
'" Of course the § 3(a)(10) exemption is presently within the SEC's rule-making power
and the SEC could easily define fairness in terms of disclosure. This however, would have little
effect in the reorganization context unless the SEC reversed its present position on the availabil-
ity of § 3(a)(10) in Chapters X and XI. Even given the reversal any SEC rule could not deny
the alternatives of § 364 or § 393, and thus, given the present statutory framework, the SEC's
rule-making power does not effectively reach reorganization securities.
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IV. THE PROPOSED SECURITIES CODE AND PROPOSED
BANKRUPTCY ACT
A. The Secuities Code
In the Proposed Federal Securities Code, the drafters have con-
solidated §§ 264 and 393 into a § 3(a)(10)-type exemption because in
their opinion the bankruptcy exemptions "are largely but not alto-
gether superflous."'' 3 Proposed § 511(e) exempts any transaction
incident to
(1) the issuance of a security to existing security holders or creditors
of the issuer if (A) the issuance is pursuant to a plan of reorganiza-
tion or an arrangement under section 77 or chapter X, XI, or XII
of the Bankruptcy Act, or (B) the terms and conditions of the
issuance are approved, after a hearing on their fairness at which all
proposed offerees have the right to appear, by a court of competent
jurisdiction, an official or agency of the United States, or a banking
or insurance commission or other governmental authority of a State
expressly authorized by law to grant such approval. 7'
The proposed section makes two basic changes in the present
statute. The first change is that the present exchange requirement is
eliminated. The object of the change was "to extend the exemption
to the issuance of securities solely for cash but only to existing secu-
rity holders or creditors of the issuer" because the present require-
ment "is without much logic."'75 Given the constraints of the absolute
priority rule in Chapter X and the limits of Chapter XI the proposed
change would not have a major theoretical impact. However, it
should be noted that the only distinctions between the issuance of
securities by any financially sound company for cash to its present
creditors and shareholders which requires registration, and the same
issuance by the same company when it is in Chapter X or XI which
does not require registration is the presence of the judicial approval
and whatever constraints the Bankruptcy Act contains. Thus, the
exemption is based in part on the same questionable premise as are
the present exemptions. This is even noted in the comments to the
ALI proposal which state that the exemption was put in its proposed
form even though "the court in approving a plan or arrangement may
be thinking more of disposing of its docket than of the protection of
investors." ' It should also be noted that the proposal deletes any
m ALI PROPOSED FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 51 1(e) Comment. (1972).
'' Id. at § 511(e)(1).
" Id. at Comment 2.
178 Id.
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remnants of the fairness requirement in the bankruptcy context. Any
restrictions on the issuance of reorganization securities must come
from the Bankruptcy Act itself, not from the Securities Code. As
argued above, this position does not permit the needed flexibility of
SEC rule-making. Given the present Chapter XI standards and prac-
tice as outlined, it is questionable whether all securities issued in all
Chapter XI proceedings should be exempt from registration.
B. The Proposed Bankruptcy Act
Since the Proposed Securities Code shifts all the substantive
restrictions from the securities acts to the bankruptcy acts it is quite
appropriate to examine the major proposals of the Commission on
the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States as they affect reorganiza-
tions."'7
The proposal consolidates the present Chapters X and XI into
a proposed Chapter VII with substantial duties being assigned to the
proposed Federal Bankruptcy Administrator. As soon as is practical
after the petition is filed, the administrator meets with the appointed
creditors' committee or committees to decide if the business should
be continued, if a trustee is necessary, and if so who it should be. A
trustee need not be appointed in every case; the ultimate decision is
made by the court. 178
The plan, which may be proposed by the creditors' committee
as well as by the administrator, may affect secured debt and equity
interets as well as unsecured debt. The most important changes from
present reorganization procedure are in § 7-303 of the proposed act
relating to the requirements of the plan. The best interests test is
discarded, but the absolute priority rule is retained in a much more
"modified" form. Equity holders and management are given vastly
increased participation rights.1 79 In addition the plan may contain
"cram-down" provisions similar to those now in use'80 and other
"' COMMISSION REPORT, Part, 1, 237-73, Part II §§ 7-101 to 7-715. [All citations to Part
II will be by section number only]. For a more detailed description of the Commission's
proposals as they effect reorganizations see King, The Business Reorganization Chapter of the
Proposed Bankruptcy Code-or Whatever Happened to Chapters X, XI, and XII, 78 CoM. L.
J. 429 (1973) [hereinafter cited as King]; Trost, Corporate Reorganizations under Chapter VII
of the "Bankruptcy Act of 1973": Another View, 48 AM. BANKR. L.J. 111 (1974); King and
Rosen, An Introduction to the Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973, 79 Com. L.J. 472 (1974).
178 § 7-102(a). In all cases where the debtor is a corporation with debts of $1,000,000 or
300 security holders, the administrator must apply for the trustee's appointment. The court
must then appoint a trustee unless the protection afforded by a trustee is unnecessary or the
expense disproportionate to the protection.
179 § 7-303(3)-(4).
I- § 7-303(7).
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standard provisions.
The plan must be approved by the court if it complies with all
the requirements of Chapter VII, is feasible, has been proposed and
accepted in good faith, is reasonable in the basis for the valuation,
and is fair and equitable (in the highly modified sense that there is a
reasonable probability that each class is fully compensated for their
interests). 8 After a plan is filed the administrator files an advisory
report on the plan similar to the report presently prepared by the
SEC . 82 Thus, the SEC has been largely displaced by the administra-
tor. After the plan is filed the court holds a hearing to decide if the
plan meets all the criteria. If it does, the court approves the plan and
the plan, the administrator's report, any court opinions, and such
other matters as the court directs are sent to all parties in interest.18
Only after the approval and transmittal of information may accept-
ances be solicited."" After a plan has been accepted by the requisite
majority and the court finds that it meets all the necessary standards,
the plan is confirmed.""
Like its predecessors, Chapter VII contains a securities exemp-
tion. It states:
No provisions of any law requiring registration of securities or reg-
istration or licensing of issuers of securities shall apply to . . . (2)
the issuance of any security pursuant to a plan in exchange for
securities of the debtor or for allowed claims, or partly in such
exchange and partly for cash or property .... 186
The exemption largely parallels §§ 264 and 393, but is intention-
ally somewhat broader. The provision also extends to all claims, thus
eliminating any question concerning post-petition claims by trustees,
attorneys, etc. The exemption, however, is not broad enough to in-
clude the issuance of securities to any new participants who finance
the reorganization. 7
When viewed in the context of all the proposals, the proposed
exemption creates a series of problems any one of which is worthy
of more detailed analysis. The major problem comes from the com-
bined effect of the different standards for approval and different
tsl § 7-3 10.
m § 7-306(b).
' § 7-306(c)-(d).
tu § 7-308. The only exception to this procedure involves plans which do not affect public
securities. In such a case an approval hearing is not held prior to the solicitation of acceptances
and no report need be filed. See § 7-307, § 7-306, Comment 3.
" § 7-310.
I § 7-314.
t § 7-314, Comment 3.
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methods of valuation. Initially it must be noted that it was the stan-
dards of fairness in Chapter X and XI which were used to breathe
some substantive restrictions into §§ 264 and 393. It is just these
standards which have been modified.
The feasibility test of Chapters X and XI has been retained, but
its meaning is limited to its present Chapter X interpretation. It
seems designed to check only "the likelihood of insuing liquidation
or further reorganization."'' 8 Thus it appears to place no substantive
restriction on the value of securities. The good faith test is also car-
ried forward. While it would probably continue to bar the use of the
proceedings as a sham for the public distribution of securities, any
further restrictions on the securities issued appears unlikely. A "fair
and equitable" test is inserted, but it carries totally different statutory
connotations than those present in Chapter X. The meaning is re-
stricted to the proposed "modified" absolute priority rule. At this
point it is sufficient to note that this "modified" fair and equitable
rule is restricted to a single statutory meaning and thus cannot form
the basis for substantive restrictions on the value of the securities
issued. Even this modified standard would not apply if the plan does
not adversely effect public securities holders and if the plan is unani-
mously adopted after full disclosure.8 9 Thus, unlike the present
Chapters, there is little room for arguing that the standards imposed
on the plan impose any minimum qualitative standards on the securi-
ties issued pursuant to the plan.
The lack of qualitative standards becomes acutely evident when
the valuation scheme is analyzed in the context of the "modified" fair
and equitable rule.' One commentator has stated that what the
commission actually proposed was to "effectively abolish the rule."''
While as a general statement that conclusion may be subject to de-
bate, it is certainly true insofar as the present fair and equitable rule
imposed a minimum quality standard on reorganization securities.
This is chiefly a result of § 7-310 which imposes the "restriction" that
there be "a reasonable basis for the valuation on which the plan is
based and the plan is far and equitable in that there is a reasonable
probability that the securities issued and other consideration distrib-
uted under thd plan will fully compensate the respective classes of
z King at 435.
"' § 7-3 10(d)(2)(B).
99 For a more detailed analysis of these problems see Brudney, The Bankruptcy Commis-
sion's Proposed "Modifications" of the Absolute Priority Rule, 48 Am. BANKR. L.J. 305 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Brudney] and Note, The Proposed Bankruptcy Act: Changes in the Abso-
lute Priority Rule for Corporate Reorganizations, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1786 (1974).
"I Brudney at 308.
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creditors and equity security holders of the debtor . ,,1 While
what is reasonable is open to considerable doubt, it is clear that the
proposal was intended to allow, and will allow, highly inflated valua-
tions at least as compared to present standards. The change will result
in the highest reasonable valuation."'
In addition, if this artificial valuation is not high enough, § 7-
303 permits a "second look" at the valuation within five years from
confirmation in order to increase the valuation for the benefit of those
who were precluded from participation under the "modified" rule.
The plan may provide for "delayed participation rights,"" 4 presuma-
bly some form of contingent stock, which would ripen into full partic-
ipation within the five years when and if the debtor's financial status
warrants it. Thus, holders of what would be worthless stock under the
modified rule are not excluded from participation, but may receive
new, contingent (but only a little less worthless) stock.
Finally, § 7-303 also permits equity holders to participate in the
new equity of the corporation in an amount reasonably approximat-
ing the value of any contribution of services, such as continued man-
agement, which they make to the debtor." This changes existing case
law and can only result in a further dilution of the total equity of the
reorganized business.
The combined effect of the changes in the fairness standards and
the loosening of the valuation process cannot help but result in the
issuance of large quantities of unregistered, nearly worthless securi-
ties. Thus the present policy imposing the "requirement of the issu-
ance of fair and sound securities" 9 ' present in the existing statute is
abandoned.
While this may fundamentally alter present reorganization doc-
trine, it is not violative of existing federal secu'rities policy. That
policy is largely disclosure oriented, and the disclosure requirements
are far stronger in the proposed act than under existing statutes.
Under the proposal the traditional functions of the SEC in reorgani-
zation, preparing a report, acting as an advisor to the court, and
expressing views on fees and other sundry matters would be shifted
from the SEC to the Bankruptcy Administrator. In all cases except
those not involving public securities, the administrator must prepare
a report and this report must be furnished to all parties in interest
"n § 7-310(d)(2)(B) (emphasis supplied).
" See Brudney at 317-31.
"4 § 7-303(3).
"4 § 7-303(4).
H S. REP. No. 1916, 75th Cong. 3d Sess. 7 (1938).
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along with other court-ordered material before any acceptances may
be solicited. Thus if the administrator fulfills his role in the same way
as the SEC presently does, the amount of disclosure should be ade-
quate in most cases. Thus, the goals of the securities statutes are
actually advanced.
However, this conclusion rests on the ability of the administrator
to prepare reports which would enable all parties to make an in-
formed investment decision. Assuming that the SEC is extremely
qualified to insure the needed public investor protection because of
its extensive experience in these areas, the wisdom of delegating this
role to a new agency may be questioned. In this context two more
provisions bear some scrutiny. Under § 7-107(c) the administrator
must give written notice to the SEC of every case involving a corpora-
tion with more than 300 shareholders. Also in a separate provision
the SEC is given standing to be heard on all matters in Chapter VII
cases.19 The envisioned role of the SEC is "to participate in an
investigation or make available to the trustee or administrator the
results of an investigation it conducted prior to the date of the peti-
tion." '198 It has been noted that this may be an unrealistic role for the
SEC once its mandatory role ceases,'99 but this is not necessarily so.
It may well be that the SEC will assume a role similar to that it now
occupies in Chapter XI proceedings. Surely the two provisions give
the SEC enough flexibility to play as large a role as is needed. Thus
the shifting of functions from the SEC to the administrator need not
necessarily result in any decrease in investor protections. With the
assistance of the administrator the SEC should be more able to focus
on abuses of the securities statutes and the adequacy of the disclosure
than what it presently is able to do.
Viewing the commission's proposals as a whole one cannot es-
cape the conclusion that in this area their recommendations are a
mixed bag. While the departure from all qualitative fairness stan-
dards is not in itself bad, certainly the encouragement of the issuance
of nearly worthless securities is questionable. The increase in disclo-
sure requirements if properly administered is potentially a major
advance. Whether it is sufficient to offset the loss in quality depends
ultimately on the premise of the whole Securities Act of 1933-that
is, given full disclosure, an investor (either alone or with the aid of a
professional) is capable of making a sound investment decision.
Thomas W. Kahle
', § 2-205(b).
§ 2-205, Comment 3.
" Brudney at 306 n.3.
